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The Fraud Exception to the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings
Daniel J. Davist
Imagine that two companies, Stephenson and Cushing, dominate
the market for a certain drug.' A new company, Flanigan, hopes soon
to introduce a generic version of the drug in the United States. First,
however, Flanigan must complete the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's testing and approval process. Stephenson and Cushing know
that the generic drug stands to hurt their profits, and they seek to de-
lay, or to prevent altogether, Flanigan's entry into the market. They
therefore agree to file complaints with the FDA claiming fraudulently
that Flanigan's product is unsafe, that its manufacturing process is un-
sound, and that the market should not allow in another player. Know-
ingly misrepresenting evidence requested by the FDA, Stephenson
and Cushing successfully block Flanigan's approval. Flanigan, now
shut out of the market, files a claim against Stephenson and Cushing
for antitrust violations
Under the antitrust laws, which are designed to prevent anticom-
petitive economic behavior, Stephenson and Cushing's actions would
almost definitely be subject to liability. Stephenson and Cushing will,
however, quickly resort to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to avoid an-
titrust liability. Created by the Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc4 and United Mine
t B.A. 1998, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 2002,The University of Chicago.
I This hypothetical is significantly similar to the one used in Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning
as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74 NC L Rev 1, 6-11 (1995) (evaluating the
potency of antitrust law and administrative procedural reform to combat the problem of sham
petitioning).
2 This claim could be brought under the Sherman Act, 15 USC §§ 1-7 (1994).
3 See 15 USC § 1. See also Radiant Burners, Inc v Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co, 364 US
656, 659-60 (1961) (holding that a conspiracy that prevented a company from getting approval
for a ceramic gas burner violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
4 365 US 127 (1961).
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Workers v Pennington,5 the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes par-
ties from antitrust liability if their "activities comprised mere solicita-
tion of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforce-
ment of laws."' This immunity relies on the First Amendment freedom
of association and right to petition the government.' But would the
immunity apply if Stephenson and Cushing knowingly misrepresented
the information in the complaint or acted fraudulently? Although the
Supreme Court has established that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
does not protect a party who has engaged in sham litigation,8 the
Court has not determined whether Noerr-Pennington immunity ex-
tends to parties who make misrepresentations or how Noerr-
Pennington immunity might apply to administrative agency proceed-
ings. Dissension reigns concerning whether such an exception exists,
and if it does exist, how the exception fits within existing Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
A fraud exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine presents an
important problem because many companies must participate in ad-
ministrative agency and judicial proceedings to engage in business.
They apply for permits and licenses, and sometimes submit their
products to testing by various agencies. Companies exert strong influ-
ence in agency proceedings, which range from "rulemaking" proceed-
ings, in which an agency acts like a legislature, to "adjudicatory" pro-
ceedings, in which an agency acts more like a court.! In particular,
companies target permit applications, like in the pharmaceutical,
transportation, communications, and energy industries." Because
agencies lack the resources to verify every statement a company
makes, a company can distort information submitted to agencies and
thus gain a competitive advantage. This Comment offers a basic
proposition: because Noerr-Pennington immunity rests on the dual
principles of the First Amendment and the statutory purposes of the
antitrust laws, the immunity should not extend beyond them.
The Comment presents two solutions to the fraud exception: one
applies to business activity in the courts, and the other involves busi-
ness activity in administrative proceedings. First, analogizing to libel
law, this Comment argues that fraud and misrepresentations in judicial
5 381 US 657 (1965).
6 Noerr, 365 US at 138. See also Pennington, 381 US at 670 ("Noerr shields from the
Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent and purpose.").
7 See Noerr, 365 US at 137-38.
8 See Part I.A.2.
9 See Ronald A. Cass, Models ofAdministrative Action, 72 Va L Rev 363,367 (1986) (iden-
tifying this distinction as the "bipolar" model of administrative action).
10 See Noah, 74 NC L Rev at 11-14 (cited in note 1) (noting the myriad governmental
agencies that must approve corporate operations).
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proceedings lie outside the realm of the First Amendment; thus, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine should not apply.
Second, in the administrative realm, this Comment distinguishes
between political and adjudicatory agency functions based on the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")" to determine when immunity
should apply. This test revolves around the fact-specific nature of the
agency inquiry. Noerr-Pennington immunity should not apply when
the agency proceeding involves significant factual inquiries (such as in
a permit application process, where applicants must apply significant
and specific factual information). Noerr-Pennington immunity should
apply where the agency proceedings are designed to make broader
policy determinations that do not rely as much on specific factual in-
formation. This fact-specific standard protects against fraud and mis-
representation (which lies outside the First Amendment'), protects
agencies from receiving deliberately false information from compa-
nies (which lies inside the purposes of antitrust laws 3), and allows the
judiciary to act in its proper role as a check on the executive.
4
Part I of this Comment analyzes the origins of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and subsequent cases concerning fraud and mis-
representation. Part L.A specifically examines the "sham" exception to
Noerr-Pennington immunity. This Part also searches for Court guid-
ance in fraud and misrepresentation cases. Part I.B discusses the statu-
tory framework for different administrative proceedings under the
APA. Part II examines lower court dissension concerning whether a
fraud exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity exists. Part III argues
that a fraud and misrepresentation exception should apply in judicial
proceedings based on recognized First Amendment limitations. This
Part examines First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly libel law,
to determine the outer boundaries of the right to petition. It then con-
siders how fraud and misrepresentation fit into that jurisprudence.
Part IV presents the solution involving administrative agency
proceedings. Using the administrative proceedings framework in Part
I.B, this Comment presents a fact-specific standard to determine when
a business's involvement in an agency proceeding should subject that
entity to antitrust liability.
11 Pub L No 89-554,80 Stat 381 (1966), codified at 5 USC §§ 551 et seq (1994).
12 See, for example, McDonald v Smith, 472 US 479,484 (1985) (finding no protection for
false statements of fact in the First Amendment). See also Part III.A.
13 The antitrust laws were meant to encourage fair competition and to provide the gov-
ernment with adequate means to monitor that competition accurately. See text accompanying
notes 15-16.
14 See Part IV.B.2.
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I. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE
NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
The antitrust laws give government broad power to prohibit
"combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, the
monopolization of trade or commerce or attempts to monopolize the
same."" This power is intended to protect free competition by forcing
companies to allocate their resources to create the highest quality
products at the lowest possible prices.'6 The reach of the antitrust laws,
however, has some limits.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine presents one limit on antitrust
law-it protects companies' lobbying efforts. To this extent, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine reflects First Amendment guarantees of free
speech and freedom to petition the government. This Part discusses
the key cases that created and interpreted the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine.
A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
1. The early cases.
In Noerr, a group of Pennsylvania truckers alleged that several
railroads and the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference engaged in
a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act." Specifically, the truck-
ers alleged that the railroads launched a negative publicity campaign
against truckers; the aim of which was to damage the trucking busi-
ness, including existing relationships between truckers and their cus-
tomers.'8 The defendants counterclaimed by stating much the same of
the truckers.'9 The district court found against the railroad company
because its campaign was "malicious and fraudulent."' The railroads
15 15 USC §§ 1-2. See D.R. Wilder Manufacturing Co v Corn Products Refining Co, 236 US
165,173-74 (1915) (stating the intended breadth of the Sherman Act).
16 See Northern Pacific Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1,4 (1958):
[The antitrust laws] rest[ on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
17 Noerr, 365 US at 129.
18 Id. The Court found that the aim of the campaign was "to foster the adoption of laws
and law enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of
distaste for the truckers among the general public, and to impair the relationship between the
truckers and their customers." Id.
19 Id at 132 (stating that the defendants claimed the truckers had conspired to "destroy the
railroads' competition in the long-distance freight business and to monopolize that business for
heavy trucks").
20 Id at 133. The Supreme Court explained: "The District Court did not expressly find that
any particular part of the railroads' publicity campaign was false in its content. Rather, it found
that the technique of the railroads was 'to take a dramatic fragment of truth and by emphasis and
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admitted to conducting a campaign to influence the passage of state
laws relating to truck weight limits and tax rates on heavy trucks, but
they maintained they had no desire to destroy the trucking business as
a competitor nor to interfere with trucker-customer relationships.'
The Supreme Court found for the railroad on two separate
grounds. First, the Sherman Act neither regulated political activity nor
infringed on the concept of representation.= Second, holding against
the railroads "would raise important constitutional questions" about
the right to petition the government.0 The Court recognized that
groups with a significant interest in the outcome of certain legislation
often provide important information to Congress about the issues in
question.2 ' The unethical tactics used in the publicity campaign were of
no moment to the Court. Pennington upheld the same immunity doc-
trine where coal companies and unions successfully persuaded the
Secretary of Labor to establish minimum wages for employees of con-
tractors, thereby frustrating the non-unionized companies' attempts to
compete in the coal market.2
Noerr-Pennington's scope expanded under California Motor
Transport Co v Trucking Unlimited.0 In California Motor, highway
carriers alleged an antitrust conspiracy by other highway carriers to
"institute state and federal proceedings," including "rehearings and [ ]
reviews or appeals from agency or court decisions," to prevent the
plaintiff from receiving operating rights or to transfer or register those
rights.2 The Court extended Noerr-Pennington immunity to adminis-
trative proceedings.? California Motor also made important strides
toward revealing when the Court would disallow immunity. *
repetition distort it into falsehood." Id at 133 n 8 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
21 Id at 131.
22 Id at 137:
To hold that the government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet
hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes
would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political
activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act.
23 Id at 138. See US Const Amend I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the
right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
24 Noerr, 365 US at 139.
25 Id at 145 (holding that "deception [of public officials], reprehensible as it is, can be of no
consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned").
26 Pennington, 381 US at 660,670.
27 404 US 508 (1972).
28 Id at 509.
29 Id at 510 ("The [Noerr-Pennington doctrine] governs the approach of citizens or groups
of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the
executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends
to all departments of the Government'). See also Part I.B.
30 Id at 515 ("First Amendment rights may not be used as the means of the pretext for
achieving 'substantial evils."), quoting NAACP v Button, 371 US 415,444 (1963).
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In discussing unethical conduct, the Court clarified that several
actions could result in sanctions. The Court relied on language in
Noerr stating that when a business used political activity as a "sham"
solely to harm a competitor, antitrust liability would survive the im-
munity challenge." Citing several cases, the Court showed that fraud,
conspiracy, and bribery could all create antitrust liability.n One exam-
ple the Court relied upon was perjury of witnesses.33 The Court then
stated in dictum that "[t]here are many other forms of illegal and rep-
rehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or judicial
processes and which may result in antitrust violations. Misrepresenta-
tions, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in
the adjudicatory process."4 With little explanation of these statements
and the scope of this sham exception, the Court concluded the high-
way carriers' alleged actions could be subject to antitrust liability."
2. The sham exception clarified.
The Court at last established the scope of the sham exception in
the litigation setting in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc v Co-
lumbia Pictures Industries, Inc. Noting that "a successful effort to in-
fluence government action ... certainly cannot be characterized as a
sham, 37 the Court outlined a two-part test for determining when liti-
gation is a sham and thus unprotected by Noerr-Pennington immunity:
The first step is to ask whether the lawsuit is "objectively baseless
... in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
31 See Noerr,365 US at 144:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influenc-
ing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an at-
tempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the applica-
tion of the Sherman Act would be justified.
32 California Motor, 404 US at 512-13. The fraud point, in particular, will become impor-
tant. See Part III. See also Walker Process Equipment, Inc v Food Machinery & Chemical Corp,
382 US 172, 175-77 (1965) (holding that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the
patent office may violate the Sherman Act, provided the other elements necessary to a Sherman
Act case are present); Continental Ore Co v Union Carbide & Carbon Corp, 370 US 690,707-08
(1962) (holding that conspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor may also re-
sult in an antitrust transgression); Rangen, Inc v Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F2d 851,857 (9th Cir
1965) (holding that bribery of a public purchasing agent may constitute an antitrust violation).
33 California Motor, 404 US at 512.
34 Idat513.
35 Id at 516. Because the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment,
the Court evaluated only the plaintiffs' complaint but concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations
came within the sham exception and remanded for trial. Id.
36 508 US 49 (1993) (involving a dispute as to whether hotels' rental of video discs to
guests violated prohibition of retransmission without a license).
37 Id at 58, citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp v Indian Head, Inc, 486 US 492,502 (1988)
and Vendo Co v Lektro-Vend Corp, 433 US 623,645 (1977) (Blackmun concurring in result).
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success on the merits."", If the lawsuit is "reasonably calculated to
elicit a favorable outcome," Noerr-Pennington immunity applies.39
Second, if the litigation is objectively baseless, then liability de-
pends on the subjective intent of the party. If the litigation "conceals
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor through the use of the governmental process-as opposed
to the outcome of that process," Noerr-Pennington immunity fails.4
Even without the immunity, however, the plaintiff must still show an
antitrust claim.
The Court did not explain how fraud or misrepresentation would
play into a determination of either of the two steps of the sham litiga-
tion test. The Professional Real Estate Court did not elaborate on how
fraud affected a determination that a suit was "objectively baseless" or
the subjective intent of the party. Unlike California Motor, which im-
plied that fraud could create antitrust liability,' the Court stated, "We
need not decide here whether and, if so, to what extent Noerr permits
the imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant's fraud or other mis-
representations."43 Because the Court did not provide guidance on
how to handle fraud or misrepresentation in litigation and other con-
texts, the lower courts are in disarray.44
B. Noerr-Pennington Cases Involving Agency Proceedings
Companies also face potential antitrust violations for their ac-
tions in administrative proceedings. The APA acts as the default sys-
tem for agency proceedings in promulgating rules and regulations. It
defines broadly the scope and character of administrative agency ac-
tions. It integrates aspects of legislative and judicial proceedings.4 - The
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id at 60-61 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Id at 61:
[E]ven a plaintiff who defeats the defendant's claim to Noerr immunity by demonstrating
both the objective and the subjective components of a sham must still prove a substantive
antitrust violation. Proof of a sham merely deprives the defendant of immunity; it does not
relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to establish all other elements of his claim.
42 404 US at 512-13 (stating that using patents obtained by fraud to exclude potential
competitors would violate the antitrust laws).
43 508 US at 62 n 6. After this proposition, the Court cited FRCP 60(b)(3) (allowing a fed-
eral court to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment" for "fraud ... misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party") and Walker Process Equipment, Inc v Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp, 382 US 172,176-77 (1965) (stating that fraud in patent litigation could lead to an
antitrust violation).
44 See Part IL.
45 See U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 14 (1947):
[T]he entire Act is based on a dichotomy between rule making and adjudication .... Rule
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distinctions it makes between different parts of proceedings are im-
portant in determining how far antitrust liability reaches into the ad-
ministrative realm.' This Part will first discuss various APA provisions
and then analyze how the Supreme Court has treated agency actions
in antitrust cases.
The APA separates administrative proceedings into two worlds
depending on whether they result in "rules" or "orders." 7 Rules have a
future effect and are "designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy.", On the other hand, orders, like judicial decisions, con-
stitute "final disposition[s]" of current controversies.' 9 Rulemaking
proceedings lead to rules, and adjudicatory proceedings lead to or-
ders. 0
Rulemaking and adjudicatory processes follow different proce-
dures. The rulemaking process requires that the administrator give
public notice of the proceeding, provide an opportunity for interested
parties to comment on the subject of a rulemaking, and include in the
final rule a brief statement of the reason for its adoption. The adjudi-
catory process, in contrast, tends to follow a more formalized proce-
dure and resembles a judicial proceeding. Parties to adjudication re-
ceive notice of the proceeding and participate more extensively in
producing and contesting the information on which the decision is
based than do parties in rulemaking.2 The APA's language lends sup-
port to the view that adjudications should resemble trials. For exam-
ple, in adjudications, "[a] party is entitled to present his case or de-
fense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence,
and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts."53 The adjudication provisions also ad-
dress burdens of proof and rules of evidence," allude to discovery pro-
cedures,55 regulate the form of the decision," require a transcript of the
making is ... essentially legislative in nature, not only because it operates in the future but
also because it is primarily concerned with policy considerations. The object of the rule
making proceeding is the implementation or prescription of law or policy for the future,
rather than the evaluation of respondent's past conduct .... Conversely, adjudication is
concerned with the determination of past and present rights and responsibilities.
46 See Part IV.
47 5 USC § 551 (1994).
48 Id § 551(4).
49 Id § 551(6).
50 See id § 551(4)-(7).
51 Id § 553 (1994).
52 Id § 554,556,557 (1994).
53 Id § 556(d).
54 See id.
55 See id § 556(c).
56 See id § 557.
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proceedings,57 and mandate that the decision be based on the record
and "supported by ... reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."'
The break between adjudications and rulemaking procedures is
not perfectly clean. The APA permits a more informal rulemaking
procedure as well as a more informal adjudication procedure. In some
rulemaking proceedings, for example, the APA allows interested par-
ties to participate in rulemaking by submitting written evidence or ar-
guments and by requiring agencies to articulate the basis of their deci-
sion." Exceptions also exist to the requirement of a trial-type hearing
in adjudicatory proceedings.o
Almost every section of the APA contains exceptions such that
the formal rigors of adjudication or rulemaking do not apply to cer-
tain types of decisions. The adjudication provision, for example, makes
exceptions for certain personnel decisions, determinations based on
inspections or tests, and matters pertaining to military and foreign af-
61fairs. The rulemaking section contains a general exception for some
matters and specific exceptions to its notice, hearing, and publication
requirements.u Since the APA acts only as a default set of rules for
agency proceedings, some federal statutes mandate that certain agen-
cies use hybrid processes that combine legislative and adjudicatory
procedures.0 In addition, the APA does not mandate that an agency
must take a particular avenue in its policy formulation. Administrative
proceedings, therefore, can exhibit characteristics of both legislative
and judicial actions.
The Court's varying treatment of administrative agencies in No-
err-Pennington cases reflects this legislative-judicial distinction. In
California Motor, the Court allowed Noerr-Pennington immunity to
extend to administrative agencies.6 The decision protected the rights
of association and petition.6 The reach of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
57 Id § 556(e).
58 Id § 556(d).
59 Id § 553(c).
60 See id § 554(a).
61 Id § 554(a)(2)-(4).
62 See id § 553(a)-(b), (d).
63 See, for example, Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, Pub L No 93-637, 88 Stat 2183 (1975) § 202(a), codified as amended at 15 USC § 57a(c)
(1994) (outlining a procedure for informal hearings); Endangered Species Act, Pub L No 93-205,
87 Stat 884 (1973), codified as amended at 16 USC § 1533 (1994) (setting different procedures
for promulgating regulations to determining whether to list a species as threatened or endan-
gered).
64 404 US at 510 (identifying administrative agencies as "both creatures of the legislature,
and arms of the executive").
65 Id at 510-11 ("We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of
petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws,
use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their
causes and points of view.").
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trine in administrative proceedings, however, is unknown. The Court
attempted to distinguish between "political activities" and "conduct in
the setting of the adjudicatory process."' Quoting Noerr, the Court
emphasized the extreme caution necessary in imputing to legislation
the ability to curtail First Amendment rights.67
The Court noted that in an adjudicatory process, however, "un-
ethical conduct ... often results in sanctions .... There are many other
forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the ad-
ministrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust
violations."' The Court qualified this language, stating that both par-
ties have the right of access to agencies "within the limits ... of their
prescribed procedures.'' Indeed, the cases recognize that antitrust li-
ability can occur if a fact-finder has concluded that the administrative
and judicial processes have been abused.0 The Court has not elabo-
rated further on this distinction.7' Because of the Court's lack of clar-
ity, lower courts have not achieved consensus in interpreting these
precedents.
II. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF FRAUD AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN NOERR-PENNINGTON JURISPRUDENCE
In the years following Professional Real Estate, courts have taken
opposing approaches to fraud and misrepresentation in antitrust pro-
ceedings. Some courts ignore the misrepresentations and apply Noerr-
Pennington immunity. Others have treated fraud and misrepresenta-
tion as independent grounds for denying Noerr-Pennington immunity.
A. The Third Circuit Ignores Fraud in Armstrong
One view of fraud advanced by courts is that agencies have sig-
nificant protections against fraud, so a fraud exception is unnecessary.
The Third Circuit addressed misrepresentation in the administrative
setting in Armstrong Surgical Center, Inc v Armstrong County Memo-
rial Hospital.7 Pursuant to statute, the plaintiff, in order to construct a
new outpatient center, had to obtain a Certificate of Need ("CON")
66 Idat512.
67 Id, quoting Noerr, 365 US at 141 ("Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution
in legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of political activities.").
68 California Motor, 44 US at 512-13.
69 Id at 515.
70 Professional Real Estate, 508 US at 58, citing California Motor, 404 US at 513.The con-
text of this discussion is where a party has pursued a policy of filing "a pattern of baseless, repeti-
tive claims." Professional Real Estate, 508 US at 58, citing California Motor, 404 US at 513. This
concession is important because it shows that the Court has left a gap open for courts to consider
whether or not the adjudicatory process itself has been abused.
71 See text accompanying notes 34-35.
72 185 F3d 154 (3d Cir 1999), cert denied, 530 US 1261 (2000).
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from the Pennsylvania Department of Health.7 The CON process in-
cludes "an extensive proceeding consisting of an investigation, an
evaluation of submitted materials, and a public hearing" to determine
whether a new center would be needed and to ensure the new facility
would not cause a needless duplication of services. The plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant hospital made misrepresentations in the
CON process that resulted in the denial of their certificate." Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff alleged that the hospital misled the Department
when the hospital claimed that it would open its own outpatient cen-
ter when, in fact, it had halted construction on the facility and did not
plan to resume.76 The plaintiff also alleged that the hospital's physi-
cians claimed falsely to the Department that they would not use the
plaintiff's proposed outpatient center."
The court held that Noerr-Pennington immunity protected the
hospital from antitrust liability.5 The court began with the proposition
that antitrust laws regulate business, not politics. The court disre-
garded the sham petition exception because the plaintiff never alleged
that the petitioning conduct was for any purpose other than obtaining
favorable government action, and the sham exception applied solely
to the use of the governmental process itself to engage in anticompeti-
tive conduct.' Therefore, because the injury came from the denial of
the CON, not the process of obtaining the CON, no liability resulted.8'
In turning to the misrepresentation question, the Third Circuit
began by pointing out that Professional Real Estate left the issue
open.n2 In part relying on the supposition that "deception, reprehensi-
ble as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is con-
73 Id at 156. See also Health Care Facilities Act, 35 Pa Stat Ann § 448.701(a)(2) (Purdon
1993).




78 Id at 164 (declining to look behind the administrative agency's decisions because the
hospital engaged solely in political activity).
79 Id at 158 (referring to Noerr as supporting "'the principle that the antitrust laws regulate
business, not politics"'), quoting City of Columbia v Omni OutdoorAdvertising, 499 US 365,383
(1991).
8o Armstrong, 185 F3d at 158 (comparing the anticompetitive use of governmental process
with the outcome of that process).
81 Id at 160 ("Each of the injuries the plaintiff claims is a direct result of the Department's
decision to deny the plaintiff's application for a CON.... [Thus] antitrust liability cannot be im-
posed on a private party who induced the state action.").
82 Id. The Third Circuit also cited Omn4 499 US at 377, for the proposition that "[s]uch a
rule [disallowing Parker immunity for corruption, bribery, or other violations of state and federal
law] would call upon the antitrust courts to speculate as to whether state action purportedly
taken in the public interest was the product of an honest judgment or desire for private gain." Id
at 161.The approach had the virtue of practicality but the vice of being unrelated to the purposes
of the Sherman Act and the antitrust state action doctrine. Armstrong, 185 F3d at 161.
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cerned," the court avoided looking into the particulars of the agency
decision. ' The statute authorized the Department of Health to regu-
late the number, size, and spacing of health care facilities. ' The De-
partment was "disinterested, conducted their own investigation, and
afforded all interested parties an opportunity to set the record
straight."' 6 It issued findings to support its conclusion that the pro-
posed center was not in the public interest.7 Although the ruling did
not include a specific finding on the misrepresentation, the Depart-
ment heard evidence on it and made a credibility determination.' Any
party who thought a fraud had been committed could have moved to
reopen the proceedings to determine if the Department was misled.9
Armstrong thus stands for two propositions: 1) that the agency has
enough valid checks to prevent fraud and misrepresentations from
tainting a decision, and 2) that courts should not inquire into the valid-
ity of agency decisions under the auspices of the antitrust laws. Fraud
and misrepresentation, therefore, do not nullify the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, according to the Third Circuit.
B. Fraud and Misrepresentation as Independent Grounds for
Eliminating Noerr-Pennington Immunity
The other main approach treats fraud and misrepresentation as
separate from the sham exception. Under this theory, a court does not
look to the two-part sham exception test in Professional Real Estate.90
Rather, fraud and misrepresentation independently nullify the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. Kottle v Northwest Kidney Center9' and Whelan v
AbelP follow this strand of reasoning.
83 Armstrong, 185 F3d at 162, citing Noerr, 365 US at 145.
84 The Third Circuit also relied on the antitrust state action doctrine of Parker v Brown,
317 US 341 (1943). Armstrong, 185 F3d at 161-62. The state action doctrine states that the
Sherman Act does not extend to actions made by states to restrain commerce. Parker, 317 US at
352. However, that doctrine involves federalism principles that are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
85 Armstrong, 185 F3d at 162. See note 73.
86 Armstrong, 185 F3d at 163.
87 Id.
88 Id ("IT]he record reflects that the decision makers recognized that there was a dispute
and made a credibility determination concerning it.").
89 Id (stating that Pennsylvania law authorizes reopening of administrative proceedings by
the agency "whenever the public interest requires").
90 See Part I.A.2.
91 146 F3d 1056, 1059-64 (9th Cir 1998) (considering the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in
conjunction with state and federal antitrust law claims and an administrative proceeding).
92 48 F3d 1247,1260 (DC Cir 1995) (holding that Noerr-Pennington does not bar claims of
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and tortious interference when plaintiff alleges that de-
fendants made deliberately false statements).
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Kottle, like Armstrong, involved a CON application." Also, as in
Armstrong, the process for receiving a CON involved an extensive
statutorily mandated process.9 Northwest blocked Kottle's CON ap-
plication and Kottle sued, claiming Northwest made false statements
and misrepresentations in the hearing.4 The court identified three pos-
sible exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity. The first was the two-
part sham litigation test of Professional Real Estate. % The second ex-
ception would be met if a series of lawsuits had been filed "pursuant
to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits
and for the purpose of injuring a market rival."4 Finally, sham litiga-
tion could be found if "a party's knowing fraud upon, or its intentional
misrepresentations to, the court deprive the litigation of its legiti-
macy."'3
Recognizing that the current suit involved an administrative
agency instead of a court, the analysis turned on "whether the execu-
tive entity in question more resembled a judicial body, or more re-
sembled a political entity."9 The court noted that, on both the federal
and state levels, administrative decisions vary from highly structured
procedural decisions by the agency to highly discretionary decisions
by trade negotiators or advisers; therefore, a "totality of the circum-
stances" test should apply to the judicial versus political analysis.
Finding that the CON procedure resembled an adjudicatory proceed-
ing, the court applied the three tests for the sham exception. '°' Al-
though the court eventually found against the plaintiff, the Kottle
93 146 F3d at 1058. However, this proceeding was in Washington State, not in Pennsylvania,
as was Armstrong.
94 Id. After receiving a CON application, the Department can conduct a public hearing. At
the hearing, oral and written evidence can be presented by the petitioner along with responses
from other health care facilities that provide similar services. If petitioner is denied, he has the
right to appeal the decision. Id. See text accompanying notes 72-74 for the CON proceeding in
Armstrong.
95 Id at 1060.
96 Id ("[T]he antitrust plaintiff must demonstrate that the lawsuit was (1) objectively base-
less, and (2) a concealed attempt to interfere with the plaintiff's business relationships.").
97 Id, quoting USS-POSCO Industries v Contra Costa County Building & Construction
Trades Council, 31 F3d 800,811 (9th Cir 1994).
93 Kottle, 146 F3d at 1060, citing Liberty Lake Investments, Inc v Magnuson, 12 F3d 155,158
(9th Cir 1993). See also Clipper Exxpress v Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc, 690 F2d
1240, 1260 (9th Cir 1982) (discussing the threat that false information presents to the "fair and
impartial functioning" of agency proceedings).
99 Kottle, 146 F3d at 1061. Whether an administrative agency resembles a judicial or legisla-
tive body is the core concern in determining whether antitrust liability applies. See Part IV.
100 Kottle, 146 F3d at 1062.
101 Id at 1062-63 (specifically (1) whether the advocacy was "objectively baseless," (2)
whether there was a pattern of behavior, or (3) whether the misrepresentations deprived the
process of legitimacy).
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framework established that fraud or misrepresentation by itself could
eliminate Noerr-Pennington immunity."
Other cases have given fraud and misrepresentation weight in de-
termining Noerr-Pennington immunity. For example, in Whelan, the
D.C. Circuit held that Noerr-Pennington immunity did not apply to de-
liberately false statements made to state securities officials.04 Instead
of using the two-part sham exception test in Professional Real Estate,
the D.C. Circuit found the false statements deprived the defendant of
Noerr-Pennington immunity.'05
Several concepts have been advocated in trying to fill in the gap
created in Professional Real Estate.'!4 All have their weaknesses and
strengths, but the myriad of conclusions begs for a more comprehen-
sive standard in determining the place of fraud or misrepresentations
allegations in response to Noerr-Pennington immunity.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING FRAUD AND
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS IN THE JUDICIAL SETTING
The judicial context provides the easier case to advocate a fraud
and misrepresentation exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Courts can already rely on significant precedent regarding the sham
exception and fraud.
Noerr-Pennington immunity rests on two self-enforcing proposi-
tions: the right to petition the government and the right to engage in
political activity.'4 To the extent that fraud and misrepresentation take
a party outside these two rights, courts can impose antitrust liability. In
other words, if the First Amendment does not protect fraud or misrep-
resentation, then the Noerr-Pennington doctrine cannot protect them,
either. This Part will examine the limits of these rights. '
102 Id at 1063 (holding that the allegations of misrepresentation were not specific enough to
overcome First Amendment concerns).
103 See, for example, Liberty Lake, 12 F3d at 159 (stating that note 6 in Professional Real
Estate made the two-part sham test inapplicable where there was proof that a party's fraud or
misrepresentations had deprived the court's opinion of legitimacy).
104 Whelan, 48 F3d at 1254-55 ("[W]e find that neither Noerr-Pennington nor the First
Amendment protects the conduct plaintiffs have alleged-namely, knowing misrepresentations
to state securities administrators and a federal court.").
105 Id at 1255 (finding that misrepresentations in an adjudicatory process are beyond the
protection of Noerr-Pennington).
106 See text accompanying notes 38-41.
107 See text accompanying notes 22-26.
108 Excellent discussions of the right to petition the government already exist. See, for ex-
ample, Raymond Ku, Antitrust Immunity, The First Amendment and Settlements: Defining the
Boundaries of the Right to Petition, 33 Ind L Rev 385,389-403 (2000) (discussing the historical
roots of the right to petition and its potential scope under Noerr-Pennington); Gary Myers, Anti-
trust and First Amendment Implications of Professional Real Estate Investors, 51 Wash & Lee L
Rev 1199, 1234-41 (1994) (discussing the right to petition and its relationship with Noerr-
Pennington). Such deep doctrinal discussions of the roots of the doctrine are outside the scope of
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A. The Limits of the Right to Petition
The right to petition extends to all branches of government."'
Like other First Amendment protections, the right to petition is lim-
ited in scope. Although the First Amendment protects theoretical dis-
cussions and ideas, false statements of fact do not enjoy the same im-
munity: "neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open de-
bate on public issues."1 The Court has adopted this analysis in the
realm of libel and defamation law, where the First Amendment right is
balanced against the "individual's right to the protection of his own
good name.. This right to protect one's reputation is based on a re-
spect for "the essential dignity and worth of every [individual]."' 2 In
McDonald v Smith, 3 the Court concluded that the right to petition
did not rise to the level of an "unqualified right to express damaging
falsehoods.""
4
Since the right to petition does not cover everything a party
might say, the question then becomes what standard should determine
what is covered. Petitions to any governmental body containing "in-
tentional and reckless falsehoods do not enjoy constitutional protec-
tion."' The standard accords with the one announced in New York
Times Co v Sullivan 11 as "actual malice": knowledge at the time the
words were false, or with reckless disregard of whether they were
false."
7
Evidence of this position abounds in the judicial rules and deci-
sions. Legal judgments procured through fraud, misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party may be set aside."8 Patents ob-
tained by knowing and willful fraud are nullified because the patent_
process's purpose has been frustrated."' Perjury is an obvious example
of testimony being nullified because of its misrepresentations."'
this Comment. The Comment merely intends to pick up the relevant points of the doctrine as
they relate to antitrust and administrative agencies.
109 California Motor, 404 US at 510.
110 Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323,340 (1974).
111 Id at 341.
112 Id, quoting Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75, 92 (1966).
113 472 US 479 (1985).
114 Id at 484.
115 Id, citing Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64,75 (1964).
116 376 US 254 (1964).
117 Id at 279-80.
118 See, for example, FRCP 60(b)(3) (allowing a court to relieve a party of final judgment,
order, or proceeding procured through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct). See also
FRCP 11(b)(3) (allowing for sanctions if attorneys present factual allegations that do not have
evidentiary support or are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation and discovery).
119 See NobelpharmaAB v Implant Innovations, Inc, 141 F3d 1059,1069-70 (Fed Cir 1998)
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B. Fraud and Misrepresentation in the Antitrust Realm
The analysis underlying fraud and misrepresentation goes hand-
in-hand with the sham exception because both apply when the gov-
ernmental process has been tainted through improper use. The sham
exception applies where a party uses "the governmental process-as
opposed to the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive
weapon."121 Fraud and misrepresentation create a judicial outcome
based on incorrect information that also may act as a bar to entry for
other competitors. In both cases, a party has abused the judicial proc-
ess to give itself an unfair advantage over a competitor.
A tort law analogy shows how fraud and misrepresentation dis-
rupt the judicial process. The tort of abuse of process is available to a
plaintiff who can show the presence of an ulterior motive and an overt
act that is improper in the ordinary course of a proceeding.' This tort
provides a remedy if legal procedure has been set in motion in proper
form, with probable cause, and even with ultimate success, but has
been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose.'2 A business, in-
tending to keep its competitor out of the market by crippling it with
litigation costs or an adverse judgment, could use misrepresentations
to distort litigation and procure a favorable outcome 1 Thus, the exis-
tence of the tort of abuse of process shows that the right to petition or
engage in political activity does not have an unlimited extension.
Fraud and deliberate misrepresentations should therefore be accept-
able grounds to eliminate Noerr-Pennington immunity in the judicial
setting. Fraud and misrepresentation place an action outside the realm
of the right to petition on which Noerr-Pennington is based.
The best standard for determining whether an action constitutes
fraud or misrepresentation for purposes of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
(holding that antitrust liability extended to a patentee who engaged in willful and knowing fraud
on the PTO). This case seems to extend principles enumerated in Walker to include "inequitable
conduct" as well as fraud. Id (noting that inequitable conduct "is a broader, more inclusive con-
cept" than fraud).
120 California Motor, 404 US at 512 (discussing perjury as an example of conduct that re-
sults in litigation sanction).
121 City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc, 499 US 365,380 (1991).
122 See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 121 at 897-900
(West 5th ed 1984).
12 Id.
124 In many situations, a plaintiff may bring an abuse-of-process tort suit as well. So why not
just let plaintiffs bring an abuse of process tort action? First, it is not clear how well the tort claim
and the fraud claim would map onto each other. There may be a large number of cases in which
courts find that anticompetitive intent is an ulterior motive or that fraud or misrepresentation
constitutes an overt act. Also, the antitrust claim has the unique feature of exposing the liable
party to treble damages, which should act as a proper deterrent to parties who knowingly pro-
vide false information in judicial proceedings. See 15 USC § 15 (stating that plaintiffs in antitrust
suits can recover treble damages and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees).
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trine is the New York Times malice standard.' Little difference exists
between the libel and antitrust contexts. 6 Using the libel standard also
gives courts case law to draw upon in determining what actions consti-
tute malice. Since the malice standard does not trample on the First
Amendment right to petition, courts using it in the Noerr-Pennington
context can ensure that the exception does not overwhelm the immu-
nity.
Although similarities exist between libel law and the antitrust
context, a plaintiff cannot bring a libel suit in all cases in which anti-
trust liability may apply. Libel suits involve accusations about the
character or qualities of another person.W In many antitrust cases,
however, the fraud or misrepresentation at issue is something the
company has said about itself. In Armstrong, for example, the issue
concerned the defendant hospital's representations of its own medical
facilities and capabilities.m Thus, antitrust law covers more situations
than libel law covers.2
This reasoning goes directly against Armstrong's assertion that
deceit and other misrepresentations can go unchecked by the judici-
ary," Kottle comes closest to this standard in allowing fraud and mis-
representations to eliminate Noerr-Pennington immunity.3' Kottle,
however, does not determine the standard for intent. McDonald re-
quires a malice standard.m Other courts emphasize that the party must
still show an antitrust injury 3 This should not be surprising-in a libel
125 See text accompanying notes 115-17.
126 In both situations, an entity knowingly uses false information to harm another. A com-
pany's knowing misrepresentations about itself or another company create the same injurious
result upheld in a libel action.
127 See McDonald, 472 US at 483-84 (noting that the right to petition is cabined by libel
law).
128 See text accompanying notes 75-78.
129 Also, in order to prevent chilling of the right to petition, broad allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation should not be allowed to survive summary judgment. In fact, the Federal
Rules require particularity in fraud pleadings. FRCP 9(b). A lack of particularity indicates that
plaintiffs are just tacking on fraud as a last point without trying to develop a specific fraud the-
ory. A number of cases reject fraud claims for lack of particularity. See, for example, Kottle, 146
F3d at 1063 (denying the claim because the plaintiff failed to state what the misrepresentations
were and expressing concerns about chilling First Amendment rights); Music Center SNC Di
Luciano Pisoni & Co v Prestini Musical Instruments Corp, 874 F Supp 543,549 (E D NY 1995)
(disallowing claim for lack of specificity); Alfred Weissman Real Estate Inc v Big V Supermarkets
Inc, 707 NYS2d 647,268 A2d 101, 107 (App Div NY 2000) (stating that specific allegations are
necessary in order not to chill legitimate lobbying activities). Plaintiffs should have this type of
information at the commencement of a lawsuit because both plaintiff and defendant are proba-
bly competitors in an industry.
130 See text accompanying notes 84-89.
131 146 F3d at 1060 (stating that if alleged anticompetitive behavior consists of misrepresen-
tation or fraud then it will be deemed a sham and "deprive the litigation of its legitimacy").
132 472 US at 483-85 (finding malice destroys absolute immunity protection of right to peti-
tion).
133 See Primetime 24 Joint Venture v National Broadcasting Co, 219 F3d 92, 103 (2d Cir
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case (which McDonald is), a plaintiff must allege injury to claim dam-
ages."4 Thus, Armstrong and Kottle do not reflect the limitations on the
right to petition implied by the framework the Supreme Court has
given to that right in McDonald and New York Times.
A fraud exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine makes sense.
The First Amendment justification for Noerr-Pennington disappears
when it protects fraud or misrepresentation. Since well-developed
case law concerning fraud already exists, courts should be able to ap-
ply the exception to Noerr-Pennington with relative ease.
IV. APPLYING THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY PROCEEDINGS USING THE FACT-SPECIFIC STANDARD
A different set of rules should govern whether the fraud excep-
tion applies in administrative actions. Recall that Congress purpose-
fully included elements of judicial and legislative functions when cre-
ating the APA's rulemaking and adjudicatory processes." California
Motor makes an explicit distinction between activity in the "political
arena" and the "adjudicatory process."' ' This distinction turns not on
the right to petition the government, but on the premise that the anti-
trust laws do not regulate political activity."' Working from the as-
sumption that the fraud exception exists in the judicial setting, the
question for the administrative setting becomes whether the proceed-
ing is judicial or legislative in nature. In California Motor, the Court
equates legislative activity with rulemaking and judicial proceedings
with the adjudicatory process. The Sherman Act considers company
actions in the adjudicatory process as business activity.' 9 Hence, anti-
trust liability applies when companies commit fraud in the adjudica-
2000) ("In addition, a plaintiff must independently show 'antitrust injury' in order to ensure that
,a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the
defendant's behavior."'), quoting Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum, 495 US 328, 334, 344
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134 McDonald, 472 US at 481 (stating that injuries suffered were not being appointed
United States Attorney, an injured reputation and career as an attorney, and suffering humilia-
tion, embarrassment, anxiety, and mental anguish).
135 See Part I.B.
136 See text accompanying notes 66-71.
137 See Noerr, 365 US at 136 ("We think it equally clear that the Sherman Act does not pro-
hibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or
the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a
monopoly.").
138 See text accompanying notes 66-71.
139 See California Motor, 404 US at 515 ("A combination of entrepreneurs to harass and de-
ter their competitors from having 'free and unlimited access' to the agencies and courts, to defeat




tory process, but they receive antitrust immunity when participating in
the legislative process.
The fact-specific standard illuminates the dichotomy between po-
litical and adjudicatory proceedings. Judicial proceedings involve a
fact-specific, particularized inquiry into a dispute between a relatively
small number of parties. Thus, adjudicatory proceedings should exhibit
the same characteristics." The specific procedures leading to an ac-
tion's resolution should not matter as much as whether the character
of the action itself is the defining of a broad policy or the settling of a
factual dispute. Thus, this Comment argues that courts should deter-
mine whether an administrative agency proceeding is conducting a
fact-specific particularized inquiry to determine if the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine reaches that activity under the Sherman Act. This
Part first discusses the elements of the fact-specific standard and then
justifies its use.
A. The Fact-Specific Standard and Its Workability
In Part I.B, this Comment demonstrated that the line between
rulemaking and adjudication is often blurry. The Supreme Court has
also noted the difficulty of pigeonholing certain actions into the rule-
making or adjudicatory sphere.41 In Londoner v Denver4' and Bi-
Metallic Investment Co v Colorado,"' the Court distinguished between
administrative and legislative proceedings in analyzing the right to be
heard under the Due Process Clause.! Because a small number of
people were involved with individualized circumstances, the Court
treated the proceeding as judicial in nature and enforced the right to
be heard."' On the other hand, "[w]here a rule of conduct applies to
more than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should have
a direct voice in its adoption."'46' The Court has noted that its decisions
"represent a recognized distinction in administrative law between
proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or
standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate
140 Alfred C Aman, Jr. and William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 120-21 (West 1993) (ex-
plaining that agency adjudications resemble Article III courts exercising federal question juris-
diction).
141 See SEC v Chenery Corp, 332 US 194,202 (1947) (noting the need to give administrative
agencies flexibility to handle specialized problems that may arise).
142 210 US 373 (1908) (requiring a hearing to challenge tax assessments).
143 239 US 441 (1915) (requiring a hearing for the same reason).
144 Id at 445-46 (distinguishing decisions that affect "a relatively small number of persons"
with those that affect large populations, which, if everyone were allowed a right to be heard,
would halt the government).
145 See Londoner, 210 US at 385.
146 Bi-Metallic, 239 US at 445.
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disputed facts in particular cases on the other.' '. 7 Thus, an appropriate
standard for determining whether a proceeding is judicial or legisla-
tive is if the proceeding involves a fact-specific inquiry involving a lim-
ited number of parties. Like the malice standard noted in the judicial
setting, the fact-specific standard brings with it significant case law for
determining if a company's actions constitute business activity punish-
able under the Sherman Act."' Courts allow agencies to proceed
through adjudication where a fact-specific inquiry takes place.'M
Application procedures, such as licensing, provide an excellent
example of a proceeding that meets the fact-specific standard. Arm-
strong, Kottle, and the example in this Comment's introduction fall in
this category."o A significant portion of antitrust cases implicating ad-
ministrative procedures involves licensing or application procedures
instead of the notice and comment procedures usually used in a rule-
making action.' A licensing or application procedure can have a wide
range of procedural formalities, but the heart of the dispute remains
whether a company has met certain statutory requirements to merit a
license or permit. The granting or rejecting of a license or application
does not have far-reaching policy implications; rather, it only affects
the parties involved in that factual determination.
Notice and comment proceedings, on the other hand, fall on the
legislative side of the ledger because of their policy emphasis." These
proceedings rely more heavily on value judgments than facts.' 3 Notice
147 United States v Florida East Coast Railway Co, 410 US 224,245 (1973) (holding that the
ICC may but is not required to hold a hearing before making rules).
148 See note 139.
149 See, for example, NLRB v BellAerospace Co, 416 US 267,294 (1974) (allowing adjudica-
tion in the area of employee-or-manager questions because of the large number of factual situa-
tions that would arise under the issue), revd on other grounds, NLRB v Hendricks County Rural
Electric Membership Corp, 454 US 170 (1981).
150 See Parts II.A and II.B.
151 See, for example, Walker Process Equipment, Inc v Food Machinery and Chemical Corp,
382 US 172,173 (1965) (patent application); Hospital Building Co v Trustees of the Rex Hospital,
691 F2d 678,682 (4th Cir 1982) (hospital need application); Clipper Exxpress v Rocky Mountain
Motor Tariff Bureau Inc, 690 F2d 1240, 1246-47 (9th Cir 1982) (tariff amendments application);
City of Kirkwood v Union Electric Co, 671 F2d 1173,1180-81 (8th Cir 1982) (rate filings before
FERC); Alexander v National Farmers Organization, 687 F2d 1173,1195 (8th Cir 1982) (applica-
tion to USDA to be qualified on various federal market orders of milk); Israel v Baxter Lab, Inc,
466 F2d 272, 274 (DC Cir 1972) (FDA drug application proceeding); Music Center &N.C. Di
Luciano Pisoni & Co v Prestini Musical Instruments Corp, 874 F Supp 543, 547-48 (E D NY
1995) (antidumping petition); WIXT Television Inc v Meredith Corp, 506 F Supp 1003, 1025-26
(N D NY 1980) (FCC application for relocation of transmission facility); Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc v Citibank, NA, 508 F Supp 91,93 (S D NY 1980) (applica-
tion to transfer data processing activities to a non-banking subsidiary).
152 Aman and Mayton, Administrative Law at 40 (cited in note 140) (noting that administra-
tive agency power "necessarily" requires policy formulation).
153 Id at 58-60 (noting that rulemaking proceedings seek to meet statutory goals and seek
broader sources of evidence than adjudications).
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and comment proceedings also tend to have a wider range of effects
than on any two given parties." Antitrust laws were not meant to ex-
tend to these broader policy actions."5
Fraud claims also distinctly apply to situations where an adminis-
trative agency engages in a fact-specific inquiry. In policy-type pro-
ceedings, allegations are less subject to fraud or misrepresentation
claims because they rely on broader social, political, or economic
judgments. Fact-specific inquiries tend to be verifiable, discrete state-
ments (for example, XYZ company made $30 million last year). Be-
cause of First Amendment concerns, courts should not worry about
the former but should be concerned about the latter, particularly if a
factual assertion specifically hurts an individual claimant. Thus, the
fact-specific standard places those fraud claims that uniquely apply to
business activity (rather than political activity) within the reach of the
Sherman Act.
B. Justifications for the Fact-Specific Standard
Two main justifications underlie the need for the fact-specific
standard to determine whether the Sherman Act should apply to
business actions before administrative agencies. First, this standard
prevents companies from engaging in unfair competition through
agency capture. Second, the fact-specific standard allows courts to act
as a check on agency action.
1. Agency capture.
The Sherman Act promotes competition, prevents monopoliza-
tion, and creates efficiency and equality of opportunity for compa-
nies.LM A party winning an administrative claim based on fraudulent
evidence wields the agency as a weapon to prevent a legitimate busi-
ness from gaining a toehold in the market. Fraudulent submissions to
such a body probably mean that the party intends to use the adminis-
trative process to delay its competitor by increasing entry costs. This
scenario invokes what commentators term the "agency capture" the-
154 See National Small Shipments Traffic Conference; Inc v Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 725 F2d 1442, 1447-48 (DC Cir 1984) (comparing differences between "[t]rial-like proce-
dures" and "[n]otice-and-comment procedures" and noting that the former is focused on indi-
vidual parties while the latter is suited for rulemaking and policy in general);Aman and Mayton,
Administrative Law at 101-02 (cited in note 140) (noting that administrative agency power nec-
essarily requires policy formation).
155 See Noerr, 365 US at 138 ("[Wje think it clear that the Sherman Act does not apply to
the activities of the railroads at least insofar as those activities compromised mere solicitation of
governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.").
156 See text accompanying notes 15-16.
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ory. M Agency capture can occur when a company or an industry (usu-
ally led by dominant companies) exerts undue influence over an
agency. A company could exercise monopoly power over an adminis-
trative agency and use the agency to maintain its monopoly power.
This result hampers equality of opportunity by allowing older firms to
shut out newer firms, and it hurts competition by entrenching certain
players in heavily regulated markets.u In this way, fraud undermines
the legitimacy of certain administrative proceedings and merits liabil-
ity."9
Administrative agencies recognize that some companies use ad-
ministrative processes to further anticompetitive goals. The Federal
Trade Commission expressed concern that firms use frivolous litiga-
tion and petitions to the Food and Drug Administration to prevent or
slow down new entrants and thus deter competition.' Plaintiffs have
alleged abuse of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Ag-
riculture, the old Civil Aeronautics Board, the Department of Com-
merce, the Federal Reserve Board, and a host of state and local agen-
cies.16 The economic rationale for these actions is simple: an incum-bent firm can use administrative proceedings to delay entry of new
157 See William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 NC L Rev 1861,1885-88 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey,
Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at
Sixty, 15 Cardozo L Rev 909,913-14 (1994); John Shephard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory ofAnti-
trust Federalism, 99 Harv L Rev 713, 723-26 (1986); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1669, 1684-87 (1975). Another version under
which agency capture can occur involves agency bureaucrats becoming so closely identified with
the company or industry that they work as tools of the company's or industry's interests. See, for
example, John E Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpreta-
tions of Agency Rules, 96 Colum L Rev 612, 677 n 308 (1996) ("'Agency capture' refers to
domination of an agency by the entities that the agency was created to control.").
158 Environmental regulation provides an excellent example. Environmental regulation
helps larger companies because they can absorb the red tape better than can small companies.
See B. Peter Pashington, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Fac-
tor Shares, 27 J L & Econ 1, 25-26 (1984) (showing that environmental regulation has placed a
greater burden on small plants).
159 There is also a strict statutory reason for finding liability. See 18 USC § 1001 (1994 &
Supp 2001) (criminalizing "knowingly and willfully" misrepresenting a material fact or state-
ment).
160 See Testimony of Mark D. Whitener, Acting Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Competi-
tion, before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 102 (1993) ("Another
ongoing investigation involves the possible abuse of regulatory processes by an incumbent firm
in order to defeat or retard market entry by a competitor. Judicial and regulatory proceedings
can be the principal hurdles faced by new entrants into pharmaceutical markets."); Mark D.
Whitener, Competition and Antitrust Enforcement in the Changing Pharmaceutical Marketplace,
50 Food & Drug L J 301, 307 (1995). The hypothetical in the introduction shows a prototypical
case of abuse of regulatory process.
161 See Noah, 74 NC L Rev at 11-14 (cited in note 1).
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products and increase transaction costs for competitors.'Q Administra-
tive proceedings, much more so than judicial proceedings, tend to rely
on the information that the parties provide to them.'6 These agencies
lack the necessary funds to verify the accuracy of every allegation."
Because of these concerns, some administrative agencies have gone so
far as to ask the courts to impose antitrust liability against those who
abuse the process to help deter future action.'6
Thus, in those circumstances in which agencies lack the resources
to verify facts in applications, permits, and licenses, the judiciary pro-
vides an excellent backstop to prevent fraudulent applications by
companies. Egregious examples of fraud that hurt competition will
lead to lawsuits brought by companies harmed by an improper rul-
ing.' Because of the heightened pleading requirements, courts can
quickly find the claims that might have merit and avoid prolonged liti-
gation. Obviously, this system will not catch all instances of fraud and
misrepresentation. Some meritorious claims may slip through because
a plaintiff does not have information to plead with particularity. With
broad civil discovery rules and the threat of treble damage liability,
however, these rules should promote more truthful submissions by
companies in agency proceedings.
Courts will also have the benefit of agency expertise because they
can come in as amici curiae. Clipper Exxpress v Rocky Mountain Mo-
162 See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself364 (Free Press
1993) ("Predation through the misuse of government processes appears to be a common but lit-
tle-noticed phenomenon."); James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First
Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 Georgetown L J 65, 69 (1985) (discussing how
abuse of government processes increases a predator's power).
163 Clipper Exxpress v Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau Inc, 690 F2d 1240, 1261 (9th
Cir 1982) ("In the adjudicatory sphere, however, information supplied by the parties is relied on
as accurate for decision making and dispute resolving."); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp v Indian
Head, Inc, 486 US 492, 499-500 (1988) (explaining the "serious potential for anticompetitive
harm" inherent in administrative agencies and other standards setting associations' rulemaking
power). Note how this is a different result from the adversarial process in a litigation setting,
where parties submit each others' evidence to thorough scrutiny.
164 See, for example, Clipper Exxpress, 60 F2d at 1262 (noting that agencies rarely have the
time or funds to verify facts). For this reason Noah's conclusion that "agencies may need to as-
sume greater responsibility for controlling the behavior of participants in administrative pro-
ceedings," Noah, 74 NC L Rev at 73 (cited in note 1), is suspect. Forcing administrative agencies
to back-check every allegation of fact made in a proceeding is extremely burdensome and costly.
Quickly the complaints would turn against the government for being so intrusive in such routine
matters. Indeed, a number of petitions are legitimate and a great number will present valuable
information. The threat of treble damages from antitrust liability would probably chill compa-
nies' desire to knowingly present false information and make administrative proceedings more
accurate in the end. See 15 USC § 15 (providing for treble damages).
165 See Clipper Exxpress, 690 F2d at 1262 n 34 (noting the ICC only had a small staff to
monitor the actions of litigants and had to rely on the parties to tell the truth and that the treble
damages provision of the antitrust laws would likely provide an incentive to bring to light such
wrongdoing).
166 See Part III.
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tor Tariff Bureau, Inc'67 provides an excellent example. In Clipper, the
Interstate Commerce Commission fied an amicus curiae brief to in-
form the court of its position regarding its tariff amendments applica-
tion process.' ' It informed the court that it lacked the resources to
check the information contained in the applications and offered its
opinion on the application.'o Thus, the fact-specific standard leads to a
world where budget-strapped, aggrieved agencies can turn to the
courts for relief from fraudulent practices without courts being de-
prived of agencies' expertise on those matters.
2. Checking agency action.
Unlike the now-defunct ICC, many agencies have procedures and
resources to audit information given them by companies applying for
licenses, permits, amendments and so forth.'70 Some agencies even im-
pose penalties for submitting bad information.7 ' Even under these
conditions, however, courts act as a check on agency action.
Courts give agencies leeway in their determinations. Courts must
allow an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous congres-
sional mandate to stand."' Courts also sometimes grant agencies sig-
nificant leeway in their conclusions of fact." This deference will vary
according to the agency and congressional mandate.' 7 Agencies have
greater expertise than the courts in those areas, so this general defer-
ence seems justified.
There must be boundaries to agency discretion. The APA allows
courts to overturn final agency actions that meet an "arbitrary and ca-
167 690 F2d 1240 (9th Cir 1982).
168 Id at 1262 n 34.
169 Id.
170 See, for example, 19 CFR § 351.307 (2001) (authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to
verify factual information); 17 CFR § 202.5 (2001) (discussing investigative methods available to
Securities and Exchange Commission).
171 See, for example, 8 CFR § 292.3(a) (2001) (discussing penalties available to the Board of
Appeals to impose on parties such as expulsion, suspension and censure in immigration matters);
37 CFR § 10.18(b) (2001) (authorizing the use of sanctions such as termination of patent pro-
ceedings, delay, and money); 47 CFR § 1.52 (2000) (discussing the ability of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission to strike various documents as sham or false if the information is incorrect
or the proper procedure is not followed).
172 See Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 843-44
(1984) (requiring deference to agency interpretations of statutes).
173 See, for example, Interstate Commerce Commission v Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers, 482 US 270,282 (1987), quoting 5 USC § 701(a)(2) (1994) (noting a "tradition of [judicial]
nonreviewability exists with regard to refusals to reconsider for material error," which tradition 5
USC § 701(a)(2) codifies by precluding review "to the extent that... agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law").
174 See, for example, United States v Mead Corp, 121 S Ct 2164,2177 (2001) (holding that
tariff classification rulings by the United States Customs Service receive minimal deference).
[69:325
Noerr-Pennington Fraud Exception
pricious" standard."5 Also, several statutes specifically allow for judi-
cial review of agency determinations. 76 Given this structure, courts act
as a check on agency abuse of discretion, possibly to keep agencies
from acting narrow-mindedly." Even though courts lack agency ex-
pertise in certain areas, they understand antitrust law and fraud claims
better than agencies do.77 Courts frequently determine if an agency's
decision is based on fraudulent evidence and have the power to over-
turn that decision. The involvement of an antitrust claim does not
change that picture.'7 In fact, the inclusion of antitrust liability in-
creases the penalty for fraud because of its treble damages provision.
Agency regulations do not hold the exclusive means for punishing
fraudulent information. Thus, the fact-specific standard remains intact
even if an agency has its own ways to find and punish fraudulent
information.
Finally, the fact-specific standard is superior to Kottle and Arm-
strong's respective approaches to determining whether an agency
should be subject to the fraud exception. Neither case articulated a
definitive standard and both allowed for broad ranges of judicial
interpretation. In particular, the Ninth Circuit admitted that it had not
"clearly resolv[ed] the scope" of the sham exception in administrative
proceedings. 7 This unarticulated standard risks chilling legitimate free
speech. While the Court has exercised caution and is willing to risk
some falsehood to promote free debate, a clearer standard will en-
courage businesses to be more diligent in their statements without
preventing them from talking at all. 81
175 See 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (1994). For an application of this standard, see Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of the United State4 Inc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co, 463 US 29,46 (1983) (holding that an order by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admini-
stration rescinding certain crash protection requirements was arbitrary and capricious).
176 See, for example, 16 USC § 1536(n) (2000) (allowing judicial review of decisions reached
by the Endangered Species Committee).
177 See, for example, Bennett v Spear, 520 US 154, 176-77 (1997) (noting concern that Na-
tional Fish and Wildlife Service focuses so much on environmental considerations that it fails to
consider legitimate economic concerns).
178 Consider Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L Rev 1157, 1219 (discussing the competence of courts com-
pared to administrative agencies in applying overarching statutes and common law to the facts).
179 See, for example, Walker Process Equipment, Inc v Food Machinery & Chemical Corp,
382 US 172, 175-77 (1965) (holding that the enforcement of a patent procured by intentional
fraud on the patent office may violate the Sherman Act, provided the other elements necessary
to a Sherman Act violation are present).
180 Kottle, 146 F3d at 1062 (noting that while the scope of the immunity is unclear in admin-
istrative proceedings, it "depends on the degree of political discretion exercised by the govern-
ment agency"), citing Forro Precision, Inc v IBM, 673 F2d 1045,1060 (9th Cir 1982).
181 See Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323,341 (1974) ("The First Amendment requires
that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.").
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Overall, this standard gives courts significantly more guidance in
determining whether or not an administrative process is political or
adjudicatory. It also protects First Amendment concerns by allowing
debate in the political arena while giving the Sherman Act its full
strength by regulating fraudulent business activity.
CONCLUSION
Let us return to the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this
Comment. Stephenson and Cushing have intentionally blocked Flani-
gan from a legitimate opportunity to participate in a market by
thwarting an administrative process designed to promote fair competi-
tion. This Comment has shown that the right to petition does not ex-
tend to the lengths that many defendant companies, such as Stephen-
son and Cushing, assert. Since the Noerr-Pennington doctrine rests on
the right to petition, it should not be allowed to go further than the
right itself. Two important goals are achieved by establishing a well-
reasoned fraud standard based on existing precedent and properly tai-
loring antitrust laws to apply to adjudicatory processes achieves two
important goals. First, administrative agencies will receive better in-
formation from parties. Second, agencies will render more accurate
decisions. The fraud exception helps promote the purposes of the anti-
trust laws by ensuring that competition takes place on fair ground.
Under this standard, Flanigan should have a fair chance of receiving
approval for its drug based on the merits, rather than being frustrated
by the misrepresentations of its competitors.
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